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This gives us six separate votes, running from 1938 to 1974. As independent variables we use the following:1 Average hourly earnings in manufacturing (AHE): Minimum wages increase the price of low-wage labor, and low-wage labor is a substitute for high-wage labor. Thus, high-wage workers should be in favor of minimum wages if the economic rationality theory is correct. As AHE in a state increase, we predict more support for minimum wage legislation.
Unions (U): Union members are typically high-wage workers; unions serve as the political organization for these workers. Thus, unionization in a state should also be associated with voting for minimum wages.
Blacks (B): Black workers tend to be overrepresented among low-wage workers and among the unemployed. To the extent that higher minimum wages are associated with higher unemployment, then, a rational informed black would be expected to be against minimum wages.
Party (P): Minimum-wage legislation may be a partisan issue. In addition, previous work (Danielsen and Rubin 1977) has shown political party to be an important variable affecting voting on economic issues after adjusting for economic interest. We define a dummy which takes the value one for a Democrat and zero for a Republican.
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA): The ADA, a liberal pressure group, annually rates congressmen on the basis of their votes for a selected set of issues and derives a "liberalism" score for each. Thus, ADA may be a measure of ideology. It is also possible that in fact ADA serves to monitor membership in a coalition of economic interests; we are currently exploring this possibility. Votes are selected by the ADA so that each year the average rating for all congressmen will be about 50 percent; thus, the effect of this variable would not be expected to change over time, and the difficulty in interpretation of the variable should have no effect in explaining changes over time in voting on minimum wages.
We used statewide data for each of the first three variables (AHE, U, B); individual data for each congressman were used for the last two (P, ADA). The ADA did not exist in 1938 and AHE by state were not available for this year, therefore, a dummy for the South was used as a proxy for these two variables in the 1938 estimate. Our variables are somewhat different than those used by S-D. The major reason for this difference is data availability: many of their variables (e.g., contributions of unions and small business to political campaigns) were not available throughout the time period which we considered. In addition, they did not use any ideological variables; they used contributions by unions to political campaigns and we used percentage of the labor force in a state which belonged to a union. It is possible for unions to make contributions to representatives in any state. However, we would expect contributions to be most effective when made to those representatives who would be most sympathetic to the union cause, which is to say, those representatives from states with relatively many union members. We would therefore not expect this difference in data to be significant.
The empirical results for 1949-74 are reported in table 1.2 Variables ADA and AHE were significant in all years and were positively associated with voting for minimum wages. Percentage of blacks in a state was negatively associated with voting in all years and was significant in 1949 and 1966. Political party was never significant; this is apparently because northern Democrats were in favor of minimum-wage legislation and southern Democrats were opposed, leading to no net effect.
Unionization was never significant. However, there may be multicollinearity problems with unions and AHE: the correlation between these variables averaged .78. If AHE are excluded from the probit analysis, unions become significant with larger likelihood estimates. If unions are excluded, the likelihood estimates of AHE become larger. It is thus a computationally impossible task to isolate the influence of unions and AHE. This is not a serious problem since if either AHE or unions or both is significant, the conclusion is the same: minimum wages are passed at the behest of high-wage workers.
Since some of the data were not available for 1938 
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The likelihood estimates did not indicate any change with time. The coefficients for AHE, blacks, and ADA are remarkably consistent, indicating little change in the impact of these variables over the 25-year period. We were unable to determine any effect of the Voting Rights Act or the increase in welfare payments on minimum-wage legislation. (In related research, we have examined relationships between these two variables.3 It appears that the Voting Rights Act has influenced voting by southern representatives on legislation dealing with income transfers [see Kau and Rubin 1977] ). Our result on wages disagrees with the result of S-D: they found that low-wage workers were associated with voting for minimum wages; we found that higher wages were associated with voting for minimum wages and that the presence of blacks (typically low-wage workers) was negatively and sometimes significantly associated with voting for minimum wages. Further research may be needed to resolve this discrepancy. 4 
